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Abstract We describe the industrial market structure of CPG categories.
The analysis uses a unique database spanning 31 consumer package goods
(CPG) categories, 39 months, and the 50 largest US metropolitan markets.
We organize our description of market structure around the notion that
firms can improve brand perceptions through advertising investments, as in
Sutton’s endogenous sunk cost theory. The richness of our data allow us to
go beyond Sutton’s bounds test and to study the underlying forces bounding
concentration away from zero. Observed advertising levels escalate in larger
US markets. At the same time, the number of advertised brands in an industry
appears to be invariant to market size. Therefore, the size-distribution of
brands across markets is characterized by bigger (i.e. more heavily advertised)
as opposed to more brands in larger markets. Correspondingly, observed
concentration levels in advertising-intensive industries are bounded away from
zero irrespective of market size.
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1 Introduction
We study the industrial market structure of branded consumer packaged goods
(CPG), a sector of the food industry of considerable economic importance.
Total domestic sales of the food industry reached roughly $950 billion in
2004, with almost 50% deriving from retail sales.1 A striking feature of the
CPG industry is the large expenditures on advertising by the manufacturers.
According to CMR, the CPG sector spent $12.4 billion and $11.9 billion
respectively across all measured media in 2000 and 2001 respectively (Business
Wire 2002). Our analysis exploits the geographic variation in CPG market
shares across large US cities (Bronnenberg et al. 2007). Our goal herein is to
characterize aspects of these cross-market differences in market structure that
can be tied to marketing activity.
Following Sutton’s (1991) Endogenous Sunk Costs (ESC) theory, we or-
ganize our description of market structure around an industry’s advertising
intensity. Advertising is assumed to increase the perceived quality of a brand.
If advertising consists of a fixed and sunk investment, Sutton’s theory predicts a
competitive escalation in advertising levels, and hence perceived brand quality
levels, in larger markets. In addition, the economies of scale in advertising limit
the extent of entry and, consequently, bound the level of concentration away
from zero even in very large markets. The two classic testable implications of
the theory consist of measuring the relationship between the size of a market
and the observed advertising intensity as well as the lower bound on market
shares respectively (Shaked and Sutton 1983, 1987; Sutton 1991, 2003).
The theory also embodies a third testable implication that consists of mea-
suring the relationship between the size of a market and the size-distribution of
branded firms in a market. According to the theory, the competitive escalation
in advertising should lead to larger brands (i.e. better brands with higher
perceived quality), without an escalation in the number of brands. A variation
on this prediction is that one might nevertheless observe an escalation in the
number of fringe brands that do not advertise. This latter aspect of the theory
was discussed through cases in Sutton (1991), but was not tested formally.
The predictions of the theory change as we alter the advertising cost func-
tion, even as we maintain the assumption that advertising increases consumer
willingness-to-pay. Reducing the convexity of advertising costs (i.e. if adver-
tising costs are born primarily as a variable rather than fixed cost) gradually
eliminates the scale economies of advertising in large markets. In this case,
larger markets would experience a competitive escalation in entry, as opposed
to advertising investment, leading to a limiting concentration of zero (Berry
and Waldfogel 2003). In an even simpler model in which entry costs are fixed
at a constant level (e.g. set-up costs do not involve advertising), we would again
observe a competitive escalation in entry in larger markets, with concentration
1“Food Retailing in the 21st Century—Riding a Consumer Revolution,” The Food Marketing
Institute, http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/FoodRetailing.pdf
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converging to zero (Shaked and Sutton 1987). Therefore, we can test amongst
these different theories of the role of advertising by looking at the relationship
between market size and the equilibrium level of advertising, the number of
advertising firms and the lower bound on concentration.
To measure these various implications of the theory, we use a compre-
hensive longitudinal database consisting of marketing data for all the brands
from 31 CPG categories, covering 39 months in the 50 largest city market
areas, as designated by AC Nielsen. Unlike previous work using international
markets, our narrower focus on markets within the US has the advantage
of ensuring more consistency in the physical characteristics of a given brand
across markets. The limited degree of physical product differentiation in many
CPG product categories facilitates the attribution of market structure to these
marketing investments. For a subset of 23 geographic markets, we match con-
temporaneous as well as historic advertising levels from several years prior to
the sample. These are measures of media advertising which, in CPG industries,
are generally used for branding purposes. The advertising data allow us to
distinguish between industries based on the extent to which they invest in
branding to build better brand quality perceptions. In addition to advertising
effort, we also observe advertising prices by market, allowing us to control
for differences in the cost of media advertising across markets. Since the data
contain all the brands available in a market within each category, we can
conduct a comprehensive cross-industry analysis of the relationship between
market size and the distribution of advertised versus non-advertised brands.
The data exhibit industry-level geographic patterns that are consistent with
the predictions of ESC theory and which collectively document several novel
stylized facts about CPG industries and brands. The typical industry/market is
concentrated. However, within an industry, the level of concentration varies
considerably across markets and, in some cases, reaches very low levels. Also
consistent with the theory, advertising levels escalate in larger markets. At
the same time, the number of advertised brands does not increase in larger
markets; although the number of non-advertised “fringe” brands increases
with market size. Partitioning the industries into advertising intense and
non-advertising intense groups, we find for the former that concentration is
bounded away from zero irrespective of market size. For the latter, concen-
tration falls towards zero in larger markets. These patterns are consistent with
the ESC notion that advertising costs are fixed and sunk, creating economies
of scale that persist even in very large markets. The patterns rule out an
alternative theory in which advertising costs vary with the level of output.
We also observe bigger brands (i.e., more heavily advertised) rather than
more brands in larger markets. The lack of fragmentation rules out alternative
models such as pure horizontal differentiation, on the demand side, and
advertising as a relatively variable cost, on the supply side.
This collection of results contributes to a growing empirical literature testing
game-theoretic models of industrial market structure formation. Our work
follows an approach pioneered by Sutton (1991, 2003), who provided several
detailed case studies testing the implications of sunk costs on market structures
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in the food industry across international markets. Our work is also related to
a literature using structural models to study market structure when crucial
market outcome data such as prices and sales are unavailable (Bresnahan
and Reiss 1991; Berry 1992). The ESC theory has subsequently been used
to describe market structures for US manufacturing industries (Robinson
and Chiang 1996), and recently for several industry case studies including
the supermarket industry (Ellickson 2004a, b), newspapers and restaurants
(Berry and Waldfogel 2003), and banking (Dick 2004, Cohen and Mazzeo
2004). Our work is also related to the literature documenting the relationship
between market size, entry and the size-distribution of firms (e.g. Bresnahan
and Reiss 1991, Berry 1992 and Campbell and Hopenhayn 2004). Insofar as
we observe more advertising in larger markets, our work is also related to the
literature studying the geographic Silicon-Valley type agglomeration of firms
(e.g. Krugman 1991, Ellison and Glaeser 1997, 1999).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the theory and some comparative static predictions from a model of ESC.
In Section 3, we describe our data. In Section 4, we test the industry-level
predictions of basic ESC theory. Section 5 concludes.
2 Endogenous sunk costs theory
2.1 Basic theory and industry level predictions
In this section, we discuss the empirical predictions that arise from a basic
model of endogenous sunk costs. Following the discussion of the model, we
clarify which forms of advertising contribute to the creation of brands in CPG
industries and why these investments may indeed be characterized as fixed and
sunk.
The basic results are based on the perfect equilibrium of a three-stage
game. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to enter an industry
which involves paying a constant sunk set-up cost. In the second stage, firms
strategically choose their brand’s positioning. In a model with advertising,
this decision would involve choosing a sunk investment level in advertising
for the purposes of increasing the perceived quality of the brand. In a model
without advertising, this stage might simply involve firms costlessly choosing
their brands’ positions in a horizontally-differentiated product space. In the
third and final stage, firms compete on prices (Bertrand Nash equilibrium).
In the following discussion, we summarize the details of the model and the
results proved formally in Shaked and Sutton (1987). We provide some tech-
nical details in Appendix A. Several crucial assumptions are required. First,
advertising raises a consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a brand. Second, the
burden of advertising falls more on fixed than variable costs. This seems like
a reasonable assumption for the CPG markets in which advertising decisions
are made in advance of realized sales. It is unlikely that advertising spending
would have a large influence on marginal (production) costs of a branded
Endogenous sunk costs and CPG categories 5
good.2 In a subsection below, we provide more details about the nature of
advertising and the plausibility of these assumptions for CPG industries. In
more general consumer settings, these assumptions may not be innocuous.
Berry and Waldfogel (2003) examine the role of this assumption for market
structure. In the restaurant industry, where they find that quality is borne
mainly in variable costs, they find that the range of observed quality levels rises
with market size while market shares fragment with market size. In contrast,
for the newspaper industry, where they expect quality to be a fixed cost, they
observe average quality rising with market size without fragmentation.
In a purely horizontally-differentiated market, Shaked and Sutton (1987)
prove that concentration converges to zero as market size increases. The
intuition is that in a model where firms bear only constant fixed entry costs,
economies of scale cease to matter in very large markets, which allows for a
proliferation in product entry. In a Hotelling model, for example, increasing
the mass of consumers along the horizontal continuum leads to a limiting result
where the entire continuum is served and all firms earn arbitrarily small shares.
In contrast, as market size increases for industries in which firms can make
fixed and sunk investments in quality (i.e. vertical attributes), we do not see
an escalation in entry. Instead, we see a competitive escalation in advertising
spending to build higher-quality products. The intuition for this result is that
advertising creates a form of vertical product differentiation. Even with only a
slight quality advantage, the highest-quality firm will always be able to garner
market share and earn positive economic profits by under-cutting lower quality
rivals. The escalation in advertising implies that economies of scale matter
even in very large markets and, hence, only a finite number of firms enter even
in the limit.
The distinction between the prediction for a model of horizontal versus
vertical product differentiation indicates that product differentiation per se
is insufficient to explain concentration. When firms cannot build vertically-
differentiated brands (by advertising) we expect markets to fragment as
market size grows. In contrast, when firms can invest to build vertically-
differentiated brands, we do not expect to see market fragmentation, but
rather an escalation in the amount of advertising and the perseverance of a
concentrated market structure. These predictions are robust to a very wide
class of discrete choice models of demand with horizontal and vertical product
differentiation.
Sutton (1991) discusses a hybrid case that arises in markets where consumers
may be segmented according to those who derive utility from the vertical
attribute (i.e. brand quality) and those who do not. In such a market, it is
possible to sustain firms that do invest in the endogenous sunk cost as well
as firms that do not. In the limit, these two subsegments of advertised and
2The main driving force for CPG private labels and store brands is the fact that one can frequently
mimick the national brand physically without the overhead required to build the brand name.
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non-advertised brands diverge to two independent market structures. As mar-
ket size grows the former set of firms will have a concentration level bounded
below. However, concentration for the latter set of firms will converge to
zero. In this respect, the theory provides differential predictions for firms that
advertise and firms that do not.
The results above generate a basic set of predictions for long-run market
structure. In industries characterized by substantial endogenous fixed and sunk
investments, such as advertising, we expect concentration to be bounded below
even as the size of the market increases in the limit. However, in the absence
of these endogenous sunk investments, we would expect concentration to
converge to zero as the market size increases in the limit. Finally, if advertising
consists of variable rather than fixed costs, we would then expect to see con-
centration converge to zero in larger markets for advertising intense industries.
2.2 Advertising as an endogenous sunk cost in CPG industries
We now briefly discuss the role of brand advertising via television media,
the investment we attribute to the ESC model above. We also discuss trade
promotions and R&D, two other candidate investments that we do not believe
lead to the market structure patterns observed in the CPG data.
For the purposes of building brand perceptions and boosting consumer
willingness-to-pay for brands, CPG firms typically use media advertising. Since
media advertising is determined in advance of sales, it corresponds reasonably
well with the fixed and sunk cost structure of the theory in the previous
subsections. In our analysis below, we use measures of media advertising to
capture a firm’s advertising effort.
Based on discussions with industry experts, we learned that CPG firms
strategically set their advertising plans by geographic area and, as a result,
advertising spending for a brand can vary significantly across markets.3 Brand
managers often allocate advertising dollars across markets based on the rel-
ative brand strength, as measured by a brand development index. Managers
can weight their spending more towards strong markets that represent a
disproportionate fraction of the sales volume for their brand (when compared
to the proportion of the target market population in that geography). In
addition, brand managers may want to deliver locally customized advertising
messages as the relevance of the benefits offered by a brand may vary across
markets. For example, snow tires are not relevant in a warmer climate and the
product and/or the associated marketing program is not targeted towards all
geographies. For the food industries in this paper, media advertising consists
primarily of spot and local cable television. Brand managers can achieve
geographic targeting through local spot and local cable advertising; but they
can also achieve this through national spot advertising, i.e., network advertis-
3The authors spoke with several industry experts from advertising agencies, such as Millward
Brown and JWT, as well as from CPG marketing divisions, such as Kraft and Unilever.
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ing that is not shown in all markets (Kantar Media Report, May 26, 2010).4
Broadcast networks can also offer different clearance rates, the percentage
of the markets or network’s local station affiliate network that has agreed
to carry the programming in which the advertisement is broadcast, allowing
a brand to advertise in wide portions of the country but not in markets that
brands might want to underweight or avoid. Accordingly, Miller Brewing, for
example, has divided the US into 61 sub-markets, each of which has its own
“highly individual plan.”5
There are several reasons for which we do not believe promotional spending
would lead to the same impact on market structure as brand advertising.
Promotional investments by CPG manufacturers consist of funds allocated
to “the trade” (i.e. retailers) primarily for the purposes of passing price-
cuts to consumers (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). A recent Nielsen survey of
manufacturers indicates promotional spending primarily as a means to increase
volume.6 Blattberg and Neslin (1990) explain that there is some evidence that
promotions may weaken brand attitude and, hence, could possibly lower con-
sumer willingness-to-pay. Finally, the cost structure of promotions is primarily
variable since the total costs of price-cuts vary with the levels of sales. As
discussed in Berry and Waldfogel (2003), this type of cost structure would lead
to fragmentation as opposed to concentration in very large markets.
Finally, we also find it unlikely that R&D investments would influence
market structure in CPG industries. Sutton (1991) referred to both advertising
and R&D as general potential sources of endogenous sunk costs. However,
Andras and Srinivasan (2003) estimate that advertising intensity for consumer
goods averages 5.6% of sales revenue, while R&D intensity is 0.7% of sales
revenue. Hence, we focus our analysis on advertising.
2.3 Brand advertising and consumer willingness-to-pay
We now provide evidence that advertising has been found to increase con-
sumer perceptions of brand quality and to raise their willingness-to-pay, much
like a vertical characteristic in a model of vertical product differentiation. Prac-
titioners believe that spending more money on “more and better advertising”
will increase brand sales (Advertising Age 1994).
Many examples exist in the context of CPGs that demonstrate that branding
does influence the perceived quality of a product and correspondingly con-
sumer willingness-to-pay. For example, Keller (2003, p. 62) summarizes the
results of taste tests using leading beer products such as Budweiser, Miller
Lite, Coors and Guinness. In a blind taste test (i.e. where consumers are not
4Kantar Media News Report, May 26, 2010, “Kantar Media reports U.S. advertising expenditures
increased 5.1% in the first quarter of 2010”.
5See “National Brand, Local Branding” at http://www.sabmiller.com/SABMiller.
6“Summary: 2003 Trade Promotion Practices”, Consumer Insight, Vol. 6(2), summer 2004, 28–34.
http://www2.acnielsen.com/pubs/documents/2004_q3_ci.pdf
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aware of the brand identities), the results indicate no perceived differentiation
between these products except for Guinness, which is found to be quite
different from other beers in the sample. However, in a separate taste test
in which consumers know the brand names, the results indicate considerable
differentiation between all the brands. In a similar beer study, Allison and
Uhl (1964) find that consumers report very different quality rank-orderings
on the same sets of products depending on whether or not the brand identities
of the products are known. They conclude that, in the case of beer, brands
are more relevant for product rankings than physical characteristics. A similar
outcome was observed with the 1985 launch of “New Coke,” a reformulation
of the flavor syrup of Coca-Cola’s flagship product. The launch was ultimately
labeled the “marketing blunder of the century.” Nevertheless, the “New Coke”
formula adopted was preferred in blind taste tests by 200,000 consumers.7
A related literature demonstrates that brand advertising specifically
influences consumer perceptions of brand quality. For instance, consumers
exposed to advertising change their brand evaluations favorably towards the
advertising brand if they remember information from the advertising (Keller
1987). Similarly, brand awareness increases through advertising (Hoyer and
Brown 1990) and repeated brand advertising increases the chance of a brand
entering a consumer’s consideration set (Nedungadi 1990). The influence of
advertising on brand preferences and choice has been shown to persist even
in mature product categories (D’Souza and Rao 1995). More specifically,
Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2004) find that brand advertising can reduce
the price elasticity of demand for specific products in commodities markets,
hence isolating the role of brand influence in otherwise homogenous products
settings.
3 Data
We use AC Nielsen scanner data for 31 CPG industries in the 50 largest
AC Nielsen-designated Scantracks8 (see Dhar and Hoch 1997, for a descrip-
tion of similar data). These are the same data used in the two companion
papers, Bronnenberg et al. (2007, 2009). We follow the convention of most
CPG practitioners who use AC Nielsen data and treat the 50 scantracks as
independent markets. This practice also has a legal precedent in the merger
trial involving Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, in which according to the courts
the Nielsen Scantracks are a legally valid market definition (F.T.C. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 1986). Finally, the geographic areas repre-
sented by a typical Scantrack are consistent with the supermarket distribution
7See story “Coke Lore” at:http://www2.coca-cola.com/heritage/cokelore_newcoke.html.
8Each Scantrack covers a designated number of counties, with an average of 30 and a range of 1
to 68. All markets include central city, suburban and rural areas.
Endogenous sunk costs and CPG categories 9
regions designated in Ellickson (2004a). Hence, on the supply side, our market
definitions correspond to the manner that CPG practitioners define markets
when making decisions. Also, on the demand side, it is unlikely that consumers
arbitrage differences in brand marketing by traveling to other markets to buy
CPG products.
The industries in the database collectively account for roughly $26 Billion
in annual national revenues. The data are sampled at four-week intervals
between June 1992 and May 1995. The CPG industries covered are all large
industries representing a wide range of both edible grocery and dairy products.
For each market, time period and industry, we observe sales, prices, and
promotional activity levels for each of the brands. Brand sales are measured
in “equivalent units”, which are scaled measures of unit sales provided by
AC Nielsen to adjust for different package sizes across brands. We compute
a brand’s market share by dividing its sales (in equivalent units) by the total
sales (in equivalent units) for the industry in a given market and time period.
The promotion data break-down the total equivalent unit sales of a brand by
the promotional conditions under which they were sold. For our analysis, we
construct a promotion variable by computing the fraction of a brand’s sales
that was sold under any form of in-store promotion including price-cuts and
merchandising such as feature advertising and in-aisle displays. In addition to
our geographic market (Scantrack) level data, we also have analogous data at
the retailer account level for those retailers in each market with local annual
revenues exceeding $2MM. Account level data encompass all stores in the
retail chain for the geographic market. There are 67 such retailers in the data,
which jointly cover 48 of the 50 Nielsen markets.
In the data, a “brand” encompasses all the stock-keeping units (SKUs) sold
bearing a given brand name. For instance, in the ground coffee category, the
Folgers brand aggregates all the SKUs with the Folgers label which embodies
a wide array of can sizes. Similarly, in the yogurt category, the Yoplait brand
aggregates all pack sizes and yogurt flavors sold with the Yoplait name on the
label. Since brand advertising decisions are made at the brand level and not
at the SKU level (i.e. we do not see television advertising for a specific flavor
of Yoplait yogurt), we are not concerned about the multi-product nature of
the firms in such instances. Even in cases where a CPG conglomerate owns
multiple brands, separate management teams typically oversee the marketing
of each brand in the portfolio. For instance, Folgers is owned by P&G—a large
brand conglomerate, but has its own separate management team responsible
for its marketing. Similarly, according to the company website, Ben & Jerry’s
continues to operate “to a large extent independently” and “separately from
Unilever’s current U.S. ice cream business” even after its acquisition by
Unilever.9 Hence, we treat each brand in our database as a single product firm.
9For additional documentation, see http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/press_center/press/
join-forces.html.
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Table 1 The structure of the data set
Industry Bread and bakery, candy and gum, dairy products, frozen entrees and side
groupings dishes, frozen and refrigerated desserts, non-alcoholic beverages, packaged
dry groceries, processed canned and bottled foods, refrigerated meatsa
Markets Albany, Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Buffalo, Charlotte,
Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, Denver, Detroit,
Des Moines, Grand Rapids, Harrisburg, Houston, Indianapolis,
Jacksonville, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Louisville, Little Rock, Memphis,
Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Nashville, New Orleans/Mobile,
New York, Oklahoma City/Tulsa, Omaha, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix,
Pittsburg, Portland, Raleigh/Durham, Richmond/Norfolk, Sacramento,
San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, San Francisco, St. Louis, Syracuse,
Tampa, Washington
Retailers A & P, Super Fresh, ABCO, ACME, Albertson’s, Almac’s, AWG, BiLo,
Big Bear, Bruno’s, Del Champs, Demoulas Market Basket, Dominick’s,
Eagle Food Centers, Farm Fresh, Farmer Jack, Fiesta Mart Inc., Food4Less,
Food Lion, Food Mart, Fred Meyer, Gerland’s, Giant, Giant Eagle,
Grand Union, Great American, H.E.B., Harris Teeter, Harvest Foods,
Homeland Food Stores, Hughes Market, Hy Vee Foods, Jewel Food Stores,
Kash N Karry, King Soopers, Kohl’s, Lucky, Lucky Stores, Minyard Food Stores,
National, Omni, P&C, Pathmark, Publix, Purity Markets, Raley’s, Ralphs,
Randall’s, Riser Foods Inc., Safeway, Save Mart, Schnuck’s, Schwegmann,
Sentry Markets, Shaw’s, Shoprite, Smith’s Food and Drug Centers, Smitty’s,
Star Market, Stop and Shop, Super Fresh, Kroger, Tom Thumb, Tops Markets,
Vons, Waldbaum’s, Wegman’s Food Markets, Winn Dixie
aWe classify the 31 industries into nine groupings
To control for brand advertising, we obtain media advertising data from
Nielsen Media Research. The advertising data consist of advertising intensity
levels measured in gross rating points (GRPs)10 for 23 of the geographic
markets. Thus, we observe the advertising GRPs for each brand in each time
period for these 23 markets. The distribution of population sizes across these
23 markets is comparable to the distribution across all 50 scantracks. One
advantage of using GRP data is that they are normalized measures and can
be used to compare advertising intensity across markets of different size.
Advertising expenditure levels can still be computed using the list price (by
market and quarter) of GRPs reported in the Media Market Guide.
Table 1 lists the CPG food categories covered, along with each of the
geographic markets and retailers in the database. In the analysis below, we
report results across the 31 industries. However, for confidentiality reasons,
we are unable to name each of these 31 categories. Instead, we use a 9-group
classification to identify the industries. For example, the bread industry is
included in the “Bread and Bakery” group, the candy industry is included
in the “Candy and Gum” group, the butter and cream cheese industries are
10GRPs are the CPG industry standard for measuring media advertising. GRPs are calculated
by multiplying reach and frequency. Reach measures the proportion of the target market that
has seen the firm’s advertising at least once. Frequency measures the average number of times
individuals in the target market saw the ad within a purchase cycle.
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contained in the “Dairy Products” group, the pizza industry is contained in the
“Frozen Entrees/Side Dishes” group, the frozen toppings industry is contained
in the “Frozen/Refrigerated Desserts” industry, the juices and coffee industries
are contained in the “Non-Alcoholic Beverages” group, the pasta industry is
contained in the “Packaged Dry Groceries” group, the mayonnaise and fruit
spreads industries are contained in the “Processed Canned/Bottled Foods”
group, and dinner sausages are contained in the “Refrigerated Meats” group.
To maintain consistency with previous research, we measure a market’s
size as its profit potential scaled by the exogenous set-up costs required for
an entrant operating a plant at minimum efficient scale. Thus, we control for
the fact that we expect the potential for entry and escalation in a market
to differ across industries with different exogenous set-up costs. Our main
measure of market profit potential is the natural logarithm of the observed
total industry revenues. We also use the natural logarithm of the population
of a geographic market to ensure our results are robust to a truly exogenous
measure of market size.11 As in Sutton, we measure the set-up costs as the
capital requirement of a firm operating at minimum efficient scale. We refer
the reader to Sutton (1991, Chapter 4) for a thorough discussion of this
approach and its limitations. We use data from the 1997 economic census at
the industry-level for the manufacturing sector. For each industry, we compute
the average value of depreciable assets by dividing the reported “Gross Book
Value of Depreciable Assets at Beginning of Year” by the reported “Number
of Companies.” A limitation of this approach is that we effectively use the
average-sized firm as the proxy for minimum efficient scale, rather than the
median-sized firm.Although not reported in the paper, all of our main results
are qualitatively similar if we assume that advertising is the only relevant fixed
cost and we do not normalize our market sizes by proxies for the exogenous
set-up costs.
4 Concentration and sunk investments in advertising
In this section, we examine whether the main predictions from the ESC
framework fit our data. We first discuss the geographic concentration patterns
both across and within the 31 industries. Next, we test the basic predictions of
the theory by examining the impact of market size on (1) advertising levels, (2)
brand proliferation, and (3) market concentration.
4.1 Concentration in CPG industries
To measure concentration, Sutton (1991) used the 4-firm concentration ra-
tio, C4, which is a popular measure in practice. However, the basic theory
11The normalization of population by the dollar value of set-up costs is not entirely intuitive, but
we view the robustness check as important nevertheless.
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predicts a lower bound on concentration, which requires at least one firm to
capture a non-zero market share irrespective of market size. To conform most
closely with Sutton’s theory, we use the one-firm concentration ratio, C1, as
our definition of concentration in each industry and geographic market. C1
measures the maximum market share across brands in an industry/market.
To conserve space, we report results for C1; however all of our findings are
robust to other standard measures of market concentration such as C2, C3 or
the Herfindal Index. Also to conform more closely with the theory, we look at
the concentration of sales output, as opposed to production output.
Table 2 summarizes the concentration levels across industries and markets.
For each industry, we compute the within-market mean concentration level
and we report the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum across
markets. On average, all of these industries look fairly concentrated in terms
of C1. However, within an industry, concentration varies considerably across
markets. The average range of concentration levels (difference between cross-
market maximum and minimum C1) across industries is 0.41. Hence, on
Table 2 One firm concentration statistics for a subset of the 31 industries (N = 50 markets)
Industry group Industry Mean C1 Std C1 Min C1 Max C1
group member
Bread and bakery 1 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.31
Candy and gum 1 0.32 0.08 0.12 0.49
Dairy products 1 0.37 0.12 0.06 0.61
Dairy products 2 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.53
Dairy products 3 0.65 0.07 0.51 0.78
Dairy products 4 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.67
Dairy products 5 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.59
Dairy products 6 0.57 0.14 0.31 0.77
Dairy products 7 0.26 0.07 0.15 0.40
Dairy products 8 0.45 0.17 0.22 0.94
Dairy products 9 0.33 0.08 0.19 0.60
Frozen entrees/side dishes 1 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.32
Frozen entrees/side dishes 2 0.37 0.08 0.22 0.57
Frozen/refrigerated desserts 1 0.56 0.15 0.21 0.79
Frozen/refrigerated desserts 2 0.32 0.09 0.15 0.63
Non-alcoholic beverages 1 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.57
Non-alcoholic beverages 2 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.37
Packaged dry groceries 1 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.43
Packaged dry groceries 2 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.39
Packaged dry groceries 3 0.57 0.12 0.33 0.87
Processed canned/bottled foods 1 0.55 0.06 0.42 0.69
Processed canned/bottled foods 2 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.32
Processed canned/bottled foods 3 0.48 0.08 0.24 0.67
Processed canned/bottled foods 4 0.32 0.07 0.19 0.45
Processed canned/bottled foods 5 0.36 0.11 0.19 0.69
Processed canned/bottled foods 6 0.48 0.14 0.23 0.76
Processed canned/bottled foods 7 0.53 0.16 0.30 0.90
Processed canned/bottled foods 8 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.43
Refrigerated meats 1 0.31 0.11 0.14 0.63
Refrigerated meats 2 0.31 0.14 0.11 0.78
Refrigerated meats 3 0.22 0.09 0.12 0.50
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average, the largest market share in an industry varies by as much as 41
share points across geographic areas. The column reporting the minimum
concentration levels reveals that while some industries remain concentrated
across all markets (i.e. never fall below 40%), other industries have markets
where concentration falls as low as 0.05 and 0.06. In summary, we observe
strong differences in concentration both across industries and markets. Next,
we will examine whether the predictions of ESC theory fit our data and hence
account for this variation in concentration across and within industries.
4.2 Advertising escalation
If advertising costs are fixed and sunk, as in the ESC model, one would
expect to observe an escalation in advertising in larger markets. We define
the advertising intensity of an industry by looking at the total advertising
investment during and before the sample, 1989 to 1995, scaled by total in-
sample industry revenues, 1993 to 1995. The upper and lower quartiles of
industry advertising intensity designate the sets of advertising intense versus
non-advertising intense industries.12 A potential concern with advertising
expenditures is that the price of advertising also varies across markets. In
particular, our largest markets (e.g. New York and LA) also have the highest
advertising prices as measured by list prices per GRP. We can control for this
problem by conducting our analysis based on GRPs, rather than advertising
expenditures. The advantage of the GRP is that it is a normalized measure,
making it more comparable across markets of differing size.
Figure 1 illustrates the escalation in advertising for larger markets. In the
upper half of the figure, we plot, by market, each industry’s average advertising
expenditure per brand, between 1993 and 1995 against market size measured
as the logarithm of revenues over the exogenous set-up costs. The figure drops
the bottom quartile of industries based on advertising intensity as advertising
expenditures tend to remain either zero or close to zero across markets in these
industries.13 To measure the market size elasticity of advertising, we regress
the logarithm of each industry’s average advertising expenditure in a market
on the corresponding de-meaned logarithm of market size and industry fixed-
effects. We obtain a statistically significant elasticity of roughly one.14 We plot
the predicted advertising levels in the figure to visualize this escalation. The
results indicate that, on average, CPG firms advertise more in larger markets,
as predicted by the theory.
12This may not an ideal measure of advertising intensity as it is based on equilibrium outcomes
of advertising and sales. A preferable approach would be to use some measure of the marginal
effectiveness of advertising in an industry. But, such measures are not readily available.
13Although not reported, the same pattern arises if we use GRP levels instead of spending levels.
Since advertising prices are higher in larger markets, this confirms that escalation in spending is
not merely an artifact of ad costs.
14The elasticity is lower, but nevertheless significantly positive if we use GRP levels instead
of expenditure levels. Hence, the escalation is not merely an artifact of higher prices in larger
markets.
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(a) Advertising expenditure per month versus market size excluding the bottom quartile industries based
on advertising intensity. The solid line corresponds to the predicted advertising levels from a regression
of log-advertising on industry fixed-effects and market size.
Fig. 1 Advertising versus market size excluding the bottom quartile industries based on advertis-
ing intensity. The top panel uses mean monthly advertising expenditures per firm in $100,000. The
lower panel uses mean monthly advertising GRPs per firm. The solid line in each plot corresponds
to the predicted advertising levels from a regression of log-advertising on industry fixed-effects
and market size
The lower half of Fig. 1 replicates the advertising escalation result using
GRPs instead of expenditures. As discussed above, this measure is more ap-
propriate for comparisons across markets of differing size. Not surprisingly, the
market size elasticity is lower since we have removed the effect of rising prices.
However, we still see an escalation in advertising in markets of increasing size.
This result is particularly striking given that ad prices are also increasing in the
larger markets. In spite of rising advertising costs, we still see an escalation in
the amount of advertising effort exerted in larger markets.
4.3 Brand proliferation
In addition to advertising escalation, ESC theory predicts a non-proliferation
in entry. The theory also distinguishes between advertised and non-advertised
brands. Specifically, the number of advertised brands does not escalate in
larger markets. However, the number of non-advertised “fringe” products
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Table 4 Summary of advertising versus non-advertising brands across all 31 categories
Market share Number of brands
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Advertising brands 0.27 0.06 0.68 1.39 0 6.04
Non-advertising brands 0.07 0.02 0.21 8.14 1.26 19.22
does escalate in larger markets. Sutton (1991) provides anecdotal support for
this phenomenon in his case studies, but is unable to provide econometric
evidence of this phenomenon across industries. In his case study of the
supermarket industry, Ellickson (2004b) documents evidence of a similar two-
tiered market structure with dominant and fringe firms in the context of
supermarkets. He finds that the number of high quality supermarkets remains
fixed across markets of varying size, whereas the number of low-quality
supermarkets increases in larger markets. A novel aspect of our database is
that we are able to document econometric support for this phenomenon across
a large cross-section of CPG industries.
Most of the industries exhibit a co-existence of brands that advertise and
brands that do not. Table 3 reports each industry’s cross-market average
number of brands and market share levels for advertised versus non-advertised
brands. We drop the private labels to focus on the proliferation of small
local brands; although adding private labels would merely strengthen our
results below. Table 4 summarizes these findings. The historic pre-sample
advertising levels are used to proxy for investment. Hence, our classification of
advertising versus non-advertising brands is based on whether a brand invested
in advertising during the years 1989–1993.15 In most industries, we tend to
observe considerably more non-advertised brands than advertised brands.
Interestingly, the market share of an advertised brand is typically considerably
larger than that of a non-advertised brand.
We next test the proliferation prediction by pooling the 31 industries and 23
geographic markets for which advertising is observed. Nim denotes the number
of brands that advertise in industry i and market m. Since Nim is a count
variable, it is assumed to be distributed Poisson with mean λim where:
λim = exp (Ximβ) (1)
and Xim contains industry fixed-effects and market sizes (the natural logarithm
of either the population to set-up costs ratio or the revenue to set-up costs
ratio). We then re-run the regression (1) using the number of unadvertised
brands as the dependent variable. The results in Table 5 indicate a statistically
insignificant relationship between market size and the number of advertising
15For the results reported, we define an advertising brand as one that advertises during each year
in our data. A non-advertising brand is defined as one that never advertised during the sample
years. Although not reported, all of our results are robust to less conservative definitions that
consider brands that “occasionally” advertise (i.e. up to less than half the time) and brands that
“occasionally” do not advertise (i.e. less than half the time).
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Table 5 Brand proliferation and market size
Number of brands versus log(revenues/set-up costs)
Market size = revenue/set-up costs Market size = population/set-up costs
Advertising Non-advertising Advertising Non-advertising
brands brands brands brands
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Intercept 0.89 0.14 1.58 0.09 0.95 0.13 1.70 0.09
Log(market size) 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.03
Log-likelihood −615.82 −1577.04 −616.50 −1579.82
The log(market size) terms are included in deviations from their mean level. Each regression also
includes industry fixed-effects
brands. However, the results do indicate a statistically significant relationship
between market size and the number of fringe brands. These findings are
robust to both definitions of market size. These results suggest that the number
of non-advertising brands increases with market size, while the number of
advertising brands does not.
4.4 Advertising and concentration
We now test whether the escalation in advertising and non-escalation in the
number of brands leads to a corresponding lower bound in concentration as
predicted by the theory. Figure 2 contains a scatterplot of observed concen-
tration levels and market size across industries and geographic areas. In accor-
dance with the theory, separate plots are provided for advertising intensive
and non-advertising intensive industries. We define advertising intensity as
an industry’s total in-sample advertising-to-sales ratio. The advertising versus
non-advertising intensive industries consist of the respective upper and lower
quartile industries based on advertising intensity. For the advertising intensive
industries, there is little evidence of a linear correlation between concen-
tration and market size. Even in the largest markets, concentration seldom
falls below 20%. Although not reported, a regression of concentration in
each industry/market on market size reveals a statistically significant concave
relationship under both market size definitions.16 In contrast, there is less
evidence of a bound in non-advertising intensive industries where we observe
concentration levels as low as 5%. In this case, a regression of concentration
in each industry/market on market size reveals a downward-sloping linear
relationship.
As in the extant literature (e.g. Sutton 1991, Robinson and Chiang 1996
and Ellickson 2004a), we test the concentration prediction by estimating a
16Sutton (1991) also finds similar evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between concentration
and market size for advertising-intensive industries. This non-monotonicity is consistent with the
theory.
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(a) Concentration vs. Market Size (and estimated lower bounds) for advertising-intensive versus
non-advertising-intensive industries.













25%most advertising-intensive industries (N=350)













25%most advertising-intensive industries (N=350)

























25%least advertising-intensive industries (N=350)

















































25%least advertising-intensive industries (N=350)
Fig. 2 Concentration vs. market size (and estimated lower bounds) for advertising-intensive
versus non-advertising-intensive industries
lower bound function. Assume C1 is drawn from a Weibull distribution. This
assumption reflects the fact that C1 is an extreme value of the distribution
of brand shares and is necessarily bounded below at zero. Since C1 is also






. Assume also that concentration in market m is distributed as
follows: C˜1m = B (market sizem) + ωm, where B (market sizem) is a parametric
function of observed market size that characterizes the lower bound. The
random variable ωm is a random draw from a Weibull distribution with shape
parameter α and scale parameter β. Since we expect concentration to be
inversely-related to market size in smaller markets, we follow the literature
and specify B (market sizem) as a quadratic polynomial of the inverse of
market size:
C˜1m = a + bmarket sizem +
c
(market sizem)
2 + ωm (2)
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Table 6 Estimated lower bound functions for concentration in advertising-intensive and non-
advertising-intensive industries
Concentration versus Concentration versus
revenues/set-up costs population/set-up costs
Ad-intensive Non-ad-intensive Ad-intensive Non-ad-intensive
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
a −1.764 0.112 −3.136 0.217 −1.679 0.155 −5.983 1.559
b 0.577 0.373 2.888 1.032 0.274 0.672 19.367 10.067
c −0.003 0.053 0.029 1.204 0.000 0.034 −0.753 11.841
α 1.225 0.035 1.812 0.051 1.237 0.035 2.114 0.054
β 2.050 0.080 2.211 0.083 2.015 0.080 2.395 0.098
C1∞ 0.146 0.041 0.042 0.022 0.157 0.054 0.003 0.011
Log-likelihood 275.555 397.032 282.326 428.447
This parametric formulation also provides us with a characterization of the





when market size approaches infinite.
The parameters for the bound function, (a, b , c)′, and the Weibull distribu-
tion, (α, β)′, are estimated using the two-step procedure from Smith (1994).17
Standard errors are computed using the simulation method discussed in Smith
(1994).
Estimation results are reported in Table 6. In general, we observe a steeper
bound function for non-advertising intensive industries, driven mainly by the
linear as opposed to the quadratic term. To illustrate, we plot the estimated
bound functions in Fig. 2. Furthermore, the estimated limiting bounds re-
ported in Table 6, C1∞, are much lower for non-advertising intensive than for
advertising intensive industries (about 15% and less than 5% respectively).
The estimated limiting bounds are not statistically different from zero at
the 95% confidence level in the case of non-advertising intensive industries.
These results are all consistent with the theory. Our findings suggest that
concentration is bounded away from zero in advertising intensive industries,
but not in non-advertising intensive industries.18 Interestingly, the findings
of a relationship between concentration and advertising contrasts with an
earlier literature in which the correlation between concentration levels and
advertising levels in consumer goods industries were found to be small and,
often, statistically insignificant (e.g. Telser 1964 and Comanor and Wilson
17In the first stage, we estimate (a, b , c)′ from Eq. 2 using a simplex search subject to the
constraint C˜1m = a + bmarket sizem + c(market sizem)2 + ωm ≥ 0. In the second stage, parameters (α, β)
′
are estimated by fitting the first-stage prediction errors to a Weibull distribution.
18Although not reported, we also examined the lower bound in concentration separately for
advertised brands and non-advertised brands. We estimate a limiting concentration level of about
0.15 for advertised brands and 0.0082 for non-advertised brands. These findings are also consistent
with the theory insofar as the subsegment of non-advertised brands fragments in larger markets.
Results are available from the authors upon request.
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1974). The contrast to earlier findings is likely due both to the quality of the
data used herein as well as the use of an approach guided by game theory.
5 Conclusions
Collectively, the results indicate that advertising intensive industries appear to
remain concentrated irrespective of market size. Our data allow us to study the
underlying sources of this concentration. We observe an escalation in the level
of advertising in larger markets. For those industries that advertise, the number
of advertising brands appears to be independent of the size of the market.
However, increasing the market size does lead to an escalation in the number
of unadvertised “fringe” brands. Hence, in larger markets we tend to see better
(i.e. more heavily advertised) brands rather than more advertised brands.
These results are consistent with the basic ESC model whereby advertising
generates economies of scale even in very large markets. In this respect, our
findings are consistent with a model in which advertising is borne mainly as
a fixed and sunk cost, as opposed to a variable cost. Furthermore, the results
are consistent with a model in which branding increases consumer willingness-
to-pay in a manner similar to a model of vertical product differentiation, as
opposed to a model of horizontal differentiation.
These results provide an economic rationale for some of the geographic
differences in category market shares described in Bronnenberg et al. (2007).
The results herein do not speak to the persistence results in Bronnenberg
et al. (2007) nor to the asymmetries of the brand shares of specific firms.
In a companion piece, Bronnenberg et al. (2009), we look at the historic
entry patterns within a subset of the categories to explain the persistence and
asymmetry.
An interesting extension of the results would be to establish why the
degree of advertising intensity varies across CPG industries. In the current
paper, we use the advertising-to-sales ratio to partition our industries into ad-
intensive and non-ad-intensive, which is based on equilibrium outcomes. A
preferable approach would be to use a measure of the marginal effectiveness
of advertising. An interesting direction for future research in this area would be
to add more structure to the empirical analysis. Our current descriptive models
help us identify evidence of a long-run effect of advertising on industrial
market structure. However, the estimation of a structural demand system,
by industry, could further enable one to measure the marginal effect of
advertising on sales and to analyze the implications for equilibrium advertising
levels in contrast with prices and promotions. Such an approach might also
provide some insights into why CPG industries differ to such a degree in their
advertising intensities.
Finally, our findings are consistent with the notion that advertising creates
economies of scale that matter even in very large markets. This result ob-
tains when advertising represents a fixed and sunk cost that raises consumer
willingness-to-pay in a manner analogous to vertical product differentiation.
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Clearly, future research on the precise microeconomic role of advertising and
how it might influence consumer willingness-to-pay in this manner would be
of tremendous interest.
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A Theoretical framework
This Appendix briefly outlines the technical details of the model and re-
sults from Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991). Consider a discrete
choice model of consumer demand with both horizontal and vertical product
differentiation. Define a product x with characteristics (ψ, η) where ψ is
vertical and η is horizontal. Assume a consumer h is described by his income,
Yh, where Yh ∼ f (Y, α), and an ideal point in horizontal product attribute
space, αh. If consumer h chooses brand x, he obtains utility:
U (x) = u (ψ, |ω − αh|, Yh − p)
= u (ψ, d, yh) (3)
where uψ > 0, ud < 0, uψy > 0 and uy and |ud| are bounded above. This model
is sufficiently general to include many of the popular empirical models used in
the brand choice literature such as the random coefficients multinomial logit
and probit.
Firms play the following three-stage game. In the first stage, they decide
whether or not to enter a market. In the second stage, they pick product
attribute levels (ψ, η) at cost F (ψ) where F is strictly positive and increasing
in the level of quality, ψ , and F
′
F is bounded above. This latter assumption
ensures that as quality levels increase, the incremental costs to raise quality do
not become arbitrarily large. In the third stage, firms play a Bertrand pricing
game conditional on the product attributes and marginal costs c (ψ), where
c (ψ) < Y < max (Yh). These assumptions imply that higher quality firms also
have higher marginal costs. However, marginal costs are bounded above by
some income level below the maximum income level and, hence, there will
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always be some consumers willing to pay for arbitrarily large quality levels.
In other words, costs increase more slowly than the marginal valuation of the
“highest-income”consumer.
The following propositions are proved in Shaked and Sutton (1987).
Proposition 1 If uψ = 0 (i.e. no vertical dif ferentiation), then for any ε > 0 ,
there exists a number of consumers S∗ such that for any S > S∗, every f irm has
an equilibrium market share less than ε.
This proposition captures the fact that, even with horizontal product
differentiation, concentration falls in large markets because the economies of
scale from the constant entry costs cease to matter.
When uψ > 0, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 There exists an ε > 0 such that at equilibrium, at least one f irm
has a market share larger than ε, irrespective of the market size.
This proposition captures the fact that when a fixed and sunk advertis-
ing cost can raise consumer willingness-to-pay, then advertising generates
economies of scale that matter even in very large markets. As a result, entry is
limited and markets remain concentrated.
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